

Reflections On Minsky: TSOM 19.4 Objects And Properties, And Architecture Of Mind

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In his book *The Society Of Mind*, where he describes the mind in terms of , Minsky writes,

However, that doesn't explain why such changes do not interact inside the mind.
(Minsky, TSOM, 199, 19.4)

This is, and his discussion on the entire page (a sub-theme), very relevant for psychiatry! Why not at stable 20 years old – leave intact those tested agency-states of mind, changing only to learn new things, same validation process? To reach 30 years, 40, 50, etc.? In same stable but more advanced state! That's the ideal anyway in the linear West, and often it's that way. But what if there are or are not temporal interactions within the mind, as new ideas influence existing ones, and existing ones set context for new ones? Isn't that a natural way to learn and grow and develop knowledge and views?

Say those agencies (partial states, agencies, divisions) in the mind responsible for right livelihood then introduce right effort in a new direction. Which parameters and representations for which agencies? This might be a matter of existent insight, that set forth the how, where, and what of new knowledge or insight, context, and awareness.

Here he also raises the question of representation in the mind that matches reality's projections. In Minsky's terms, in terms of objects. Object-representation in terms of properties he proposes, match the way the mind is structured – its very architecture.

Then Minsky says, "...that way [for example], a single word can activate many different kinds of thoughts at once!" Usually in ways that match objects, or however one sees the world. Now, what if this single word activates a number of different thoughts and different kinds of thoughts that then prove to be an anticipated or unanticipated combination, or one that is an idea that is a psychiatric problem? This is still in the realm of introducing a word in the architecture of mind, that has these repercussions in other agencies....

So such a "through-system" could naturally activate in a functional way. Or what about in a dysfunction or disorder way -- using the same natural machinery? Then, the questions are several: what is the natural but accurate or error unfolding of this? Isn't it a way to learn an accurate or error perception, concept, or experience? And are there ways to buffer or architect accurate perceptions and so forth; and to address and re-learn or re-orientate out of an error state or unfolding? How is physiology involved, and is it possible

for the mind's intention to "write" to the wetware, and wake-state from it again, or otherwise intersect it?

And this becomes then epistemological and ontological questions ... the nature of being and reality, the mind's view and its architecture and projections to match, and the way it arranges, constructs, and represents knowledge(s).

If your agency named "the importance of work" becomes set next to a new neighbor "fascination with hobby" or "immersion with an idea" then activated at a lower priority to this second neighbor, it might not be heard of, while this neighbor pursues its fascination or immersion. The same natural functioning is there, just a new set of agencies and modified connections and relationships. If the mind, by its focus parameterized or balanced or not, puts particular attention on a particular agency and its context, can that modify wetware down to cellular and energy considerations?

And what happens when an object isn't optimum, suitable, perfect, or itself malfunctions or breaks? How does Minsky's natural apparatus respond, to account for these existential questions and reality? This "single word" may reflect a state of things that require further explanation, problem-solving, or adaptation. And the states of an object "there" and "not there" may be fascinating – or an existential crisis, whether for an infant with a toy or its food, or for an adult with its job or a thought or a social relationship.

As Minsky suggests, this "single word" may run through multiple agencies as they try to describe an object or situation or world-space. Such results, then, may or may not be anticipated, either in wonderful or painful ways. So context knowledge may help.

There may be ways other than to see the world in terms of objects, and different states of mind depending on the individual. One thing Minsky emphasizes is the relationship among things, and the importance of what I term body-mind-architecture-world-space. His very model in the beginning of TSOM is to present a set of combinatorial interconnecting action perception ethics thinking (etc) memes that unfold as the sans-self operational mind. He tends not to posit a consciousness beyond this, but various traditions do. Awareness and consciousness might be their own thing integrated with Minsky's model. The remainder of the sections in this chapter 19 have further insights possible.